Since last year’s surprising election of Donald Trump, Beijing has looked to up the stakes and increase its leverage in the disputed South China Sea. This past December, China seized a U.S. Navy unmanned underwater vehicle near the Philippines. The seizure was made outside of Beijing’s expansive and ambiguous “nine-dash line.” While the drone was eventually returned to Washington, the incident reveals a new level of mistrust and strategic rivalry between China and the United States. It has also further colored the water amid growing uncertainty on the future trajectory of Sino-U.S. relations under the coming Trump administration.

Beijing is looking to adapt on the fly to the new team in Washington, which has a frenetic, and uncertain, foreign policy direction toward China and the region. On one hand, Beijing was cautiously cheering the defeat of Hillary Clinton — as it worried the former presidential favorite would enact a tougher line toward bilateral relations. Beijing also watched gleefully as Trump repeatedly castigated allies in the region — especially archrival Japan — for not paying their fair share of the burden for U.S. security guarantees. Trump’s denouncement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership was icing on the cake as Obama’s rebalance policy — largely viewed in a containment lens in Beijing — suffered a crushing body blow.

China’s honeymoon with Trump was short-lived however, and while many questions remain it is clear that he intends to press hard against Beijing on the trade front. Trump called on China on numerous occasions during his campaign — and following his election — as engaging in unfair trade practices and manipulating its currency. He has now appointed a hawkish envoy — Peter Navarro — for his top trade post to lead the new White House National Trade Council. If this was not enough, Trump has also talked tough on “core interests” to China such as Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Beijing is and should be concerned — but they are also looking to take advantage. The prime arena for this in the coming months will be the South China Sea, due to China’s increasing strategic leverage. Other pressure points that China can touch on — such as Taiwan and the East China Sea dispute with Japan — are more complex and the escalation ladder could lead to significant consequences for Beijing if it crosses a line. Part of this is due to U.S. treaty and quasi-treaty commitments to Tokyo and Taipei, respectfully. But China is also wary of the advanced military (especially naval) capabilities of both Japan and Taiwan, and thus is likely to limit its provocations to so-called “gray-zone probing.”

The situation in the South China Sea is different and Beijing rightly sees that it has the strategic advantage, with other claimants in the region (such as the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia) possessing little capacity to deter or mitigate Chinese actions. Even the most powerful competitor in the region — Vietnam — lacks the maritime capabilities, both coast guard and naval, to effectively alter Beijing’s calculus.

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/01/15/commentary/world-commentary/trump-era-looms-beijing-fortifies-south-china-sea/#.WH1vNLZ96DV